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*  I liked America from the first, perhaps because I had been somewhat prejudiced against it. There was in 1950 a feeling of freedom, of personal 
independence, which did not exist in Europe and which, I thought, was even stronger than in New Zealand, the freest country I knew. These were the 
early days of McCarthyism… but judging by the general atmosphere I thought that this movement, which was thriving on fear, would in the end defeat 
itself. On my return to England I had an argument about this with Bertrand Russell…. 
           The greatest and most lasting impact of our visit was made by Einstein. I had been invited to Princeton, and read in a seminar a paper on [quantum 
and classical physics]... In the discussion Einstein said a few words of agreement, and Bohr spoke at length.... 
           I learned to my surprise that Einstein thought my suggestions concerning simplicity… had been universally accepted, so that everybody now knew that 
the simpler theory was preferable because of its greater power of excluding possible states of affairs; that is, its better testability.... 
          It is difficult to convey the impression made by Einstein's personality. Perhaps it may be described by saying that one felt immediately at home with him, 
his good sense, his wisdom, and his almost childlike simplicity. It says something for our world, and for America, that so unworldly a man not only survived, but was 
appreciated and so greatly honoured. 
            —Sir Karl Popper, Unended Quest, 1992 
† I only know that he who forms a tie is lost. The germ of corruption has entered into his soul. 
—Joseph Conrad, Victory: An Island Tale, 1915 
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EPIGRAPH 
 
 
In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid 
impossibilities. 
       ARISTOTLE. 
 
     —Aldus Huxley, Island, 1962 
 
I suppose the process of acceptance will pass through the usual four stages: 
(i)   This is worthless nonsense, 
(ii)  This is an interesting, but perverse, point of view, 
(iii)  This is true, but quite unimportant, 
(iv)  I always said so. 
—J.B.S. Haldane, Journal of Genetics, 1963 
 
 
 
 
  
PRÉCIS 
The theory presented here was developed to address the problem of the long-term 
survival of the human species. This paper tables axioms which fruitfully model The 
Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, a theoretical framework which, reductio ad 
absurdum, falsifies many widely-held economic, evolutionary, and ecological principles, 
including the central thesis of ‘ecological economics’. This brief communiqué lays the 
foundation for an evolutionary stable, sustainable economic development strategy, and, 
thus, fosters national security, international cooperation, global threat mitigation, and, 
ultimately, survival of the human species.* 
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*  Perhaps such an effort of effectively thinking through these implications requires a combination of qualifications which nobody possesses to a 
sufficient degree and which the specialist who feels sure in his own field therefore hesitates to undertake. To do it adequately one would indeed 
have to be equally competent… as a logician and as a mathematician, and as a physicist and as a philosopher. I need scarcely say that I possess 
none of these qualifications. But since it is doubtful whether anybody does, and since a least nobody who possesses them as yet has tried his hand 
at this problem, it is perhaps inevitable that the first attempt should be made by somebody who had to try and acquire the necessary equipment as 
he went along (1:vii). 
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§ 1.  THESIS 
THE THEORY presented here was developed to address 
the problem of human survival on Earth,* a  planet lacking 
central authority: 
Research relevant to the goals of sustainable 
development has long been pursued from bases as 
diverse as geography and geochemistry, ecology 
and economics, or physics and political science. 
Increasingly, however, a core sustainability 
science research program that transcends the 
concerns of its foundational disciplines and focuses 
instead on understanding the complex dynamics 
that arise from interactions between human and 
environmental systems. Central questions include 
the following. How can those dynamic 
interactions be better incorporated into emerging 
models and conceptualizations that integrate the 
Earth system, social development, and 
sustainability? How are long-term trends in 
environment and development reshaping nature-
society? What factors determine the limits of 
resilience and sources of vulnerability for such 
interactive systems? What systems of incentive 
structures can most effectively improve social 
capacity to guide interactions between nature and 
society toward more sustainable trajectories? 
How can science and technology be more 
effectively harnessed to address sustainability? 
(3:1737). 
We will explore these questions and several others. 
     Thus, in light of the scope of our ambitious endeavor, 
wasting no time with introductions (cf. 4), we’ll hit the 
ground running: How can these dynamic interactions be better 
incorporated into a model for sustainability? 
One states as axioms several properties that it 
would seem natural for the solution to have and 
then one discovers that the axioms actually 
determine the solution uniquely. [Our] two 
approaches to the problem, via the negotiation 
model [and] via the axioms, are complementary; 
each helps…justify and clarify the other (5:129). 
                                                
*  To discover how the extinct species have from time to time been 
replaced by new ones down to the very latest geological period, is 
the most difficult, and at the same time the most interesting 
problem in the natural history of the earth. The present inquiry… 
seeks to eliminate from known facts a law which has determined, 
to a certain degree, what species could and did appear at a given 
epoch (2:190). 
§ 2.  AXIOMS 
Axiom I - Ground Zero Premise 
ALL THINGS living are in search of a better 
world.  
     Men, animals, plants, even unicellular 
organisms are constantly active. They are trying 
to improve their situation, or at least to avoid its 
deterioration. Even when asleep, the organism is 
actively maintaining the state of sleep: the depth 
(or else the shallowness) of sleep is a condition 
actively created by the organism, which sustains 
sleep (or else keeps the organism on the alert) . 
Every organism is constantly preoccupied with 
the task of solving problems. These problems 
arise from its own assessments of its condition 
and of its environment; conditions which the 
organism seeks to improve. 
     An attempted solution often proves to be 
misguided, in that it makes things worse. Then 
follow further attempts at solution – further trial 
and error movements…. 
     All organisms are fully occupied with 
problem-solving. Their first problem is survival. 
But there are countless concrete problems that 
arise in the most diverse situations. And one of 
the most important problems is the search for 
better living conditions: for greater freedom; for 
a better world. 
     According to this optimistic interpretation, it 
is through natural selection† and (we may 
suppose) through an external selection pressure 
that a strong internal selection pressure comes 
into being at a very early stage; a selection 
pressure exerted by the organisms upon their 
environment. This selection pressure manifests 
itself as a kind of behavior that we may interpret 
as searching for a new ecological niche. 
Sometimes it is even the construction of a new 
ecological niche (6:vii-viii). 
                                                
†  Natural Selection is not Evolution. Yet, ever since the two words 
have been in common use, the theory of Natural Selection has 
been employed as a convenient abbreviation for the theory of 
Evolution by means of Natural Selection, put forward by Darwin 
and Wallace. This has had the unfortunate consequence that the 
theory of Natural Selection itself has scarcely… received separate 
consideration (7:vii). 
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Axiom II - Resource Uncertainty Premise 
Global natural resource consumption is estimated at rates 
ranging from 20% to 300% of earthly replenishing rates; 
however, in light of Axiom  V and Axiom  VI, this figure is 
ultimately indeterminable, as future demand (as altered 
by future, stochastic events) is unknowable. 
Axiom III - Ecological Uncertainty Premise 
Axiom II poses uncertain and unquantifiable threats 
(negative externalities) to Axiom I and Axiom IV. However, 
scientific and technological advances derived through 
inter-dependent linkages associated with Axiom II also 
ultimately contribute uncertain and unquantifiable positive 
externalities toward the mitigation of Axioms IV-VI. 
Axiom IV - Political Uncertainty Premise* (8-18) 
Survival…is the basic, continuing, inescapable 
problem for all living organisms... It follows that 
survival is the... ‘problem’ for human societies 
as well; it is a prerequisite for any other… 
objectives…. Our economic and social life…, 
[and] the actions of… governments... [is] either 
directly or indirectly related to the meeting of 
our basic survival needs (17:abstract). 
Axiom  V - Planetary Uncertainty Premise 
Even if we are able to mitigate threats posed by Axiom II 
and Axiom IV (i.e. Warfighting),† in light of Axiom I and 
Axiom IV, planetary uncertainty mandates that an 
inhabitable planet must be discovered, and immigration 
must occur within an unknown and unknowable time-
frame, < ≈50,000 years from present (cf. 18 ; 19). 
     Although details pertaining to the risk factors outlined 
below represent a considerable discourse in of itself, (18) 
surveys, highlights, and ranks many known risks.  
     However, any and all known and unknown risks are 
theoretically included: the object is not to provide an 
exhaustive list of risk factors, but rather highlight the 
hereto unrecognized nature of the dilemma catastrophic 
astrophysical and planetary phænomena present to The 
Problem of Sustainable Economic Development. It may be of 
interest to note, however, that The Problem of Global  
Warming is ranked 8th (also ranked 8th in 18); only two are 
of anthropogenic nature. Risks are presented in an order of 
                                                
*  The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from 
the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be 
performed only by means of a military force (8:747). 
† Can war be rational?... The answer is yes, it can be. In one of the 
greatest speeches of all time… Abraham Lincoln said: ‘Both 
parties deprecated war; but one would make war rather than let 
the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let 
it perish. And the war came.’ It is a big mistake to say that war is 
irrational (10:351). 
approximate relevance, but, again these risk factors 
ultimately lie well-beyond the reach of probability 
theory: 
     (i) The Problem of Meteorites (cf. 18 ; 20)‡ 
     (ii) The Problem of Super-Eruptions  (cf. 18 ; 22) 
     (iii)  The Problem of Supermassive Star Collapse  (cf. 18) 
     (iv)  The Problem of Chaotic Behaviour  (cf. 23-24)§ 
     (v) The Problem of Solar Flux  (cf. 18) 
     (vi)  The Problem of Ohmic Decay (cf. 25) 
     (vii) The Problem of Industrial Agricultural (cf. 26-29) 
     (viii) The Problem of Global  Warming (cf. 18 ; 30) 
     (ix) The Problem of Ice Ages (cf. 18) 
Axiom  VI - Universal Uncertainty Premise 
This may represent the least understood, simple truth on 
Earth (cf. 31-37). Do we have ample reason to believe the sun 
will rise tomorrow? Many conclude that, yes, based upon 
5,292.5 billion affirmative inferences (365 days X 14.5 
Byr), the sun will rise tomorrow. However, Axiom  V 
highlights phænomena which eventually will falsify this 
inference.  
     “Man has an intense desire for assured knowledge. 
That is why Hume’s clear message was crushing” 
(38:22).** 
                                                
‡ The Earth has a long and violent history of collisions with 
extraterrestrial bodies such as asteroids and comet nuclei. Several 
of these impacts have been large enough to produce major 
environmental changes, causing mass extinctions and severe 
alterations to weather patterns and geography. There is no reason 
to suppose that the likelihood of such collisions will be any less in 
the future and the spread of human settlement, civilization, and 
particularly urbanization, makes it much more likely that a future 
impact, even relatively small, could result in the massive loss of human life 
and property. Despite the fact that the technology exists to predict 
and to some extent prevent such events, there is currently no 
coordinated international response (21:abstract). 
§  There are several physical situations in the solar system where 
chaotic behavior plays an important role. Saturn's satellite 
Hyperion is currently tumbling chaotically. Many of the other 
irregularly shaped satellites in the solar system had chaotic 
rotations in the past. There are also examples of chaotic orbital 
evolution. Meteorites are most probably transported to Earth 
from the asteroid belt by way of a chaotic zone. Chaotic behavior 
also seems to be an essential ingredient in the explanation of 
certain non-uniformities in the distribution of asteroids. The 
long-term motion of Pluto is suspicious (24:abstract). 
** It took a remarkably long time before the novelty of the 
intellectual situation was grasped. Few realized what had 
happened. David Hume…saw that a great step forward had been 
taken, but he did not understand just how great and how radical 
this advance in human knowledge really was. I am afraid that 
even today many people still do not fully understand this  (6:36). 
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§ 3.  HYPOTHESIS 
Yes, we do indeed discover ‘that the axioms actually 
determine a solution uniquely,’ as the true nature of 
several widely-held – though false – theories immediately 
come to light. We will begin to explore these truths 
with a highly simplified model, THE TRULY 
NONCOOPERATIVE GAME OF LIFE ON EARTH: 
WHAT ARE THE RULES OF THE GAME? 
 Axiom I, Axiom II, Axiom III, Axiom  V, Axiom  VI 
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE GAME? 
 Homo sapiens (P1) vs. Universe (P2). 
WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF THE GAME? 
Homo Sapiens =  Survival. 
Universe = ? 
The Dilemma 
As we begin to strategize, a dilemma becomes apparent 
before play begins: In light of the fact that P2‘s objective = 
unknown, P1 faces the strategic dilemma presented by 
universal uncertainty (Axiom  VI): P1 survival requires 
defending insularity, but this defense must be split 
between two largely contradictory and inherently uncertain 
strategies: S1: defending Ecological Insularity (Axioms I-III), 
and S2: defending Planetary Insularity (Axioms IV-V).  
     In other words, resources must be split between two 
invariably contradictory objectives, but Axiom  VI renders 
it impossible to determine how much to allocate to each 
over time. The impassable difficulty lies within the 
observation that we can not nor will ever be sufficiently 
informed to understand how much relatively ‘ecologically 
degrading’ economic activities have been and always will 
be required in our race to offer solutions relating to S2.       
     Indeed, this highlights the disquieting nature of       
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (39).* 
     But all hope is not lost; this tactical dilemma does not 
negate the existence of an ESS: “The laws of nature are 
approximate…: we first find the ‘wrong’ ones, and then 
we find the ‘right’ ones” (41:2); indeed, our Axioms 
enable us to hone in on the ‘Unity of Nature’ by a 
sweeping process of elimination. 
     The logical implications which follow from our axioms 
falsify an extraordinarily wide-range of theories—
including the central thesis of ‘ecological economics’ and 
the canons of a number of influential contemporary 
ideologies – including ideological environmentalism and 
socialism; our theoretical framework enables us to exclude 
many false theories, thereby moving us closer to the 
                                                
* Life's toughest choices are not between GOOD AND BAD, but 
between BAD AND WORSE (40:preface). 
truth (and thus ESS) (cf. 32 ; 42).† 
Brundtland’s Error 
Sustainable Development in Small Island Development States: 
Issues and Challenges notes the ‘seminal’ Brundtland Report 
defined sustainable development as: 
Development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (43:1). 
A review of the vast body of literature on this topic soon 
reveals that this definition is almost universally accepted.     
     We trust, however, that we have demonstrated that this 
definition is theoretically impossible. Countless theorists have 
fallen into this trap: 
Population growth, rising per capita consumption 
and the use of environmentally malign 
technologies are steadily eroding [ecological] 
services…. A major problem is to determine 
how to allocate resources in various ways to solve 
the human predicament. Scientists have much of 
the information necessary for making those 
decisions, so the biggest problem is in the 
purview of social scientists. They must help to 
determine how best to move society from 
knowledge to action (44:abstract). 
But our Axioms clearly illustrate that ‘social scientists’ do 
not nor ever will have the ‘necessary information’ 
(miljoovervakingssystemer) for making these decisions.  
     We may also pause to briefly consider how remarkable 
it is that, long ago, this conclusion was derived without 
the aid of our indirect proof:‡ 
                                                
† When we propose a theory, or try to understand a theory, we 
also propose, or try to understand, its logical implications; that 
is, all those statements which follow from it. But this… is a 
hopeless task: there is an infinity of unforeseeable nontrivial 
statements belonging to the informative content of any theory, 
and an exactly corresponding infinity of statements belonging to 
its logical content. We can therefore never know or understand 
all the implications of any theory, or its full significance. 
      This, I think, is a surprising result as far as it concerns logical 
content; though for informative content it turns out to be rather 
natural…. It shows, among other things, that understanding a 
theory is always an infinite task, and that theories can in principle 
be understood better and better. It also shows that, if we wish to 
understand a theory better, what we have to do first is to discover 
its logical relation to those existing problems and existing theories 
which constitute what we may call the “problem situation” 
      Admittedly, we also try to look ahead: we try to discover new 
problems raised by our theory. But the task is infinite, and can 
never be completed (42:26). 
‡  Reductio ad absurdum, which Euclid loved so much, is one of a 
mathematician’s finest weapons (45:19). 
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The statesman, who should attempt to direct 
private people in what manner they ought to 
employ their capitals, would not only load 
himself with a most unnecessary attention, but 
assume an authority which could safely be 
trusted, not only to no single person, but to no 
council or senate whatever, and which would 
nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man 
who had folly and presumption enough to fancy 
himself fit to exercise it (8:485). 
Countless and inevitable ‘altered circumstances,’ which 
countless ecologists and sundry social theorists have failed 
to recognize, will present themselves in due course and – 
quite literally – pound their conjectures to dust. 
On Truly Noncooperative Games 
The first chapter of FM 21-76 , ‘The  Will to Survive,’ 
begins: “Two things that you can do now to help you 
prepare are train for survival in different environments and 
learn about the area where you are going” (46:1-1), but in 
the truly noncooperative game of life on Earth, in light of 
Axiom  VI, we remain forever unable to learn about the area 
where we are going because ‘we’ are ‘going’ into the 
unknown and unknowable future, and thus we may wish to 
briefly explore the most important section of a well-
known thesis.* Although we may be getting a bit ahead of 
ourselves, the implications which readily follow from our 
theory as they relate to dominant strategy in the 
international arena may already be fairly clear:  
There are situations in economics or international 
politics in which, effectively, a group of interests 
are involved in a non-cooperative game without 
being aware of it ; the non-awareness helping to 
make the situation truly non-cooperative (48:23). 
Indeed, there have always been inescapable situations and there 
always will be inescapable situations which make the situation 
truly non-cooperative. 
     And thus, in reality, all the games that people, 
nations, planets, and the universe play are all 
noncooperative games† with incomplete information (50).  
     However, perhaps ironically, the ultimate solution to 
                                                
*  The entire thesis is 27 typescript, very generously double-spaced. 
Frankly, I have always considered the most important sections to 
be the first 6 pages…and the last pages (from 21 to 26) on 
motivation, interpretation, and applications. For many years, I 
have accused John of padding the thesis in the middle (47:164). 
†  The Nash equilibrium has helped to clarify a distinction sometimes 
still made between ‘cooperative’ and ‘noncooperative’ games… 
One trend in modern game theory, … the ‘Nash program,’ is to 
erase this distinction… so that all games can be modeled as 
noncooperative (49:4000). 
this problem hinges upon unprecedented levels of 
international cooperation: 
Science has greatly extended the range of 
questions in which man has a choice; it has 
extended man’s freedom to make significant 
decisions. Is there anything in the methods of 
science itself, or in the spirit of science, which 
can help in the making of these decisions? To 
what extent is there a play on the word science 
which can mislead us and take us up false roads 
when we speak of this science of human 
relationships? Is there anything we can learn from 
the relevance of science to politics? 
     If we are to answer these questions and 
answer them honestly, we must recognize 
important and basic differences between 
problems of science and problems of action as 
they arise in personal or in political life. If we fail 
to recognize these differences, we shall be 
seeking magic solutions and not real ones 
(51:108-109). 
On the Law of Superabundance 
“How much is enough?”  Put more concretely, it 
is : What are the minimum conditions for the 
long-term persistence and adaptation of a species 
or population in a given place? This is one of the 
most difficult and challenging intellectual 
problems in conservation biology. Arguably, it is 
the quintessential issue in population biology 
(52:1-2). 
If our answer to this question is not implicitly clear, we 
shall render it explicitly: this problem is also theoretically 
insoluble. A half-century prior to (2, 53-54), an influential 
exploration of this challenging problem began as follows: 
I think I may fairly make two postulata. 
     First, That food is necessary to the existence 
of man. 
     Secondly, That the passion between the sexes 
is necessary and will remain nearly in its present 
state (55:4). 
These ‘postulata,’ the essence of which provided 
Darwin’s ‘Malthusian Insight’ of 1838 (56:122), 
demonstrated an intuitive grasp of The Law of 
Superabundance, and, in light of our Axioms, we discover 
that the solution to this problem is neither ‘population 
control’ (57-58), nor “to increase global food and timber 
supply to accommodate a world growing to 10 billion or 
more people” (59:19679), because, once again, (i) we’re 
unable to pursue either strategy with any conviction. 
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     As The Law of Superabundance stipulates, “the effort 
towards population…[is] always greater than the means to 
support it” (55:12).*  And of course nature knows best—
because populations may plummet at any unknowable 
point in time: we have outlined many scenarios whereby, 
“even if death doesn’t get you right away, you’re unlikely 
to have much spare energy for sex” (60:124).† 
On the True Nature of Economic Organization 
Very few of us realize… the intensively unusual, 
unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary 
nature of the economic organization by which 
[we] live... We assume some of the most 
peculiar and temporary of our late advantages as 
natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and 
we lay our plans accordingly. On this sandy and 
false foundation we scheme for social 
improvement and dress our political platforms, 
pursue our animosities and particular ambitions, 
and feel ourselves with enough margin in hand to 
foster, not assuage, civil conflict…. 
     But perhaps it is only in England and America 
that it is possible to be so unconscious… The 
earth heaves and no one but is aware of the 
rumblings. There is not just a matter of… 
‘[economic] troubles’; but of life and death, of 
starvation and existence, and of the fearful 
convulsions of a dying civilization (62:3-4). 
As our Axioms illustrate, innumerable geopolitical, 
planetary, or astrophysical phænomena eventually will 
instantly render the inhabitants of Earth a'ohe nao 'ai i ka 
papa a,‡ or, if there is something left to eat, any and all 
survivors – from peasants to Presidents to Philosopher 
Kings – may find themselves “hunters, the lowest and 
rudest state of society” (8). 
     But of course the problem is that it takes years – even 
several generations – to become Jägermeistern. Millions, 
                                                
*  By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life 
of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept 
equal. This implies a strong and constantly operating check on 
population from the difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty must 
fall somewhere and must necessarily be severely felt by a large 
portion of mankind (55:5). 
†  One can argue that all environments are hostile, and that death 
and extinction are probable events, while survival is improbable. 
Just how life has managed to overcome this improbability is a 
problem which many biologists find challenging and fascinating. 
In my opinion, this problem may well be used as the framework 
on which to build the teaching of biology (61:450). 
‡ Literally, ‘nothing but burnt food to eat,’ used to refer to a 
‘terrible situation’ (63:130). 
even billions of people – especially the highly 
interdependent inhabitants of the ‘first-world’ – may, 
some day, discover just how much Darwinian fitness they 
do or do not possess.§ 
On Sustainable Economic Development 
And now that we’ve constructed a solid theoretical 
foundation with our Axioms, we’re now able to develop a 
tenable solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic 
Development by developing a 
unified theory of value informs ESS by resolving 
fundamental, open-problems in economics, 
evolutionary theory, and conservation biology. 
This solution illuminates dimly seen politico-
economic principles, illustrates the central role 
relative insularity plays in natural selection, 
informs ESS at the individual, and national level , 
and thus, as a whole, informs strategy for human 
survival. First we derive a global solution via 
axioms, then develop The Principle of Relative 
Insularity, a postulate which informs ESS for our 
negotiation model, The Earth Island Survival Game. 
This game informs ESS at the national level , 
tactics which resolve The Tragedy of the Commons, 
promote human survival, national security, 
international cooperation, global threat 
mitigation, and thus illuminate the illusive path 
toward sustainable development (65:precis). 
However, there is one key solution we may wish to equip 
ourselves with prior to setting off on this quest; although 
it may be tempting to dive into this excitement, in 
acknowledgement of the fact that 
in this age, which believes that there is a short 
cut to everything, the greatest lesson to be 
learned is that the most difficult way is, in the 
long run, the easiest (66:12 ; cf. 67). 
                                                
§  In a harsh year as far as survival factors are concerned, only the 
best individuals survive; all others are eliminated. In a mild year 
only the worst are culled and most individuals survive. At the 
beginning of the next breeding season, as a result of such great 
survival a much more diversified population is available for the 
action of sexual selection and for selection contingencies. The 
existence of this culling method was soon pointed out by Herbert 
Spencer when he called natural selection a ‘survival of the fittest.’ 
He should have said ‘survival of the fitter.’ The survivors are those 
left over after all the inferior individuals have been eliminated. 
This elimination process is not at all a ‘selection of the best.’ 
Curiously, it has never been remarked that the consequences of an 
elimination process may be quite different from those of a 
selection process (64:135). 
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Thus, to help make this necessarily long journey as easy as 
possible, we may wish to take the time for a proper 
introduction after all (cf. 4), as the solution to The Problem 
of Sustainable Economic Development on islands helps us 
derive the solution to The Problem of Sustainable 
Development on the island of Earth. Thus, please consider 
this warm invitation to explore a discourse which 
tables conceptual building blocks, prerequisite 
analytical tools, and a guiding principle for The 
Earth Island Survival Game, a bounded delay 
supergame which models The Problem of 
Sustainable Economic Development at the global 
level. We begin our exploration with an 
introduction to The Principle of Relative Insularity, 
a postulate which informs ESS for ‘island’ and 
‘continental’ players alike. Next, we model 
‘island’ economic development with two bio-
geo-politico-economic models and their 
respective strategies: The Mustique Co. 
Development Plan, and The Prince Edward Island 
Federal-Provincial Program for Social and Economic 
Advancement. These diametrically opposed 
strategies offer an extraordinary comparative 
study. One island serves as a highly descriptive 
model for The Problem of Sustainable Economic 
Development (i.e. The Tragedy of the Commons); the 
other model informs an ESS which promotes 
survival, resource holding power, cooperative 
behaviours, self-sufficiency, and independence by 
illuminating the illusive path toward Sustainable 
Economic Development on islands (4:precis). 
“This sketch is most imperfect;* but in so short a space I 
cannot make it better.  Your imagination must fill up very 
wide blanks” (53:6, cf. 68).† 
                                                
* The writer's object in putting forward his views in the present 
imperfect manner is to submit them to the test of other minds, 
and to be made aware of all the facts supposed to be inconsistent 
with them. As his hypothesis is one which claims acceptance solely 
as explaining and connecting facts which exist in nature, he 
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